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I n December 2010, the self-immolation of a Tunisian fruit vendor sparked what has come to be termed the “Arab Spring.” What fi rst appeared as an isolated act of protest against local authorities quickly gained broader signifi cance, as 
it was followed by a series of demonstrations that has shaken the grip of autocratic 
regimes across the Arab world. A year later, three longstanding dictators—Zine El 
Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, and Muammar el-Qaddafi  
of Libya—have been ousted, after varying degrees of violence. Syria, Yemen, and 
Bahrain have all witnessed extensive turmoil, raising serious questions about the 
legitimacy and survival of their rulers. Elsewhere, the political leaders of Morocco, 
Algeria, and Jordan have also been pressured into enacting reforms to try to assuage 
public demands.
What underlying long-term conditions set the stage for the Arab Spring? Clearly, 
the possibilities are manifold. For example, The Economist’s (2011a) “shoe-thrower’s 
index” of the vulnerability of Arab regimes lists many possible determinants of 
instability: years in power of the incumbent; size of the youth population cohort; 
democracy, corruption, press freedom, and GDP per capita (as a summary measure 
of economic performance). In this paper, we do not seek to rule out a contrib-
uting role for these and other structural forces that have been proposed; in places, 
we will acknowledge and comment on some of these other forces. However, we 
are convinced that education and its connection with the economic environment 
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deserve prominent consideration in any inquiry into the Arab Spring and other 
similar episodes of political change.
The argument that education positively affects the political development and 
democratization of nations has a long and venerable vintage (Dewey 1916; Lipset 
1959, 1960). At a more micro level, a vast body of evidence confi rms that individuals 
with a higher educational attainment consistently exhibit a greater propensity to 
participate in the full spectrum of political activities, from milder forms of engage-
ment such as voting or discussing politics to more public forms of mobilization 
such as demonstrations.1 This positive relationship holds true in virtually any survey 
dataset that asks about political engagement, even after controlling extensively for 
other individual traits such as age, gender, and income. Indeed, Putnam (1995a, 
p. 68) claims with some justifi cation that education is “the best individual-level 
predictor of political participation.”
But education and economic opportunity can be mismatched. Huntington 
(1968, p. 48) discusses how higher education in many modernizing countries often 
failed to provide skills that were relevant to the countries’ needs, churning out 
graduates faster than jobs could be created, and thus leading instead to alienation 
and instability: “The higher the level of education of the unemployed, . . . the more 
extreme the destabilizing behavior which results.” Along similar lines, Davies (1962) 
famously posited that rising expectations associated with expansions in education 
could, when left unmet, spill over into political violence, and several observers have 
highlighted the potential for this combustible mix of conditions in the Arab world 
(Courbage and Todd 2007; Noland and Pack 2007).
Indeed, the Arab world has experienced a remarkable expansion of education 
in recent decades. Table 1 shows a ranking of countries around the world by the 
observed increase in average years of schooling in the population aged 15 and over 
between 1980 and 2010. We use the latest version of the Barro and Lee (2010) 
dataset, updated in September 2011, which provides quantitative information on 
educational achievement across 146 countries spanning all inhabited continents. 
Eight of the top 20 countries as ranked by schooling increases in the general popula-
tion are members of the Arab League, including notably Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. 
A ninth country, Iran, is from the broader Middle East region and has been the site 
of a series of mass protests since mid-2009.2
1 This positive empirical relationship between political participation and schooling has been explored 
extensively by political scientists and economists, including: Verba and Nie (1987), Rosenstone and 
Hansen (1993), Putnam (1995b), Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995), Bénabou (2000), Schlozman 
(2002), Dee (2004), Freeman (2004), Milligan, Moretti, and Oreopoulos (2004), Hillygus (2005), 
Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Shleifer (2007), Sondheimer and Green (2010), and Campante and Chor (forth-
coming). A smaller body of work fi nds contrary evidence in some instances on the relationship between 
schooling and voting specifi cally, but we argue later that this detracts little from our main thesis.
2 It may appear odd that Germany ranks so highly on this top-20 list; this happens largely because the 
Barro–Lee data suggest relatively low levels of schooling attainment in Germany in 1980. On this, Barro 
and Lee (2001, p. 559–60) have noted the discrepancy between their estimates, based on data from 
UNESCO, and other estimates by the OECD which tend to ascribe higher education levels to Germany 
in past decades. They attribute these differences mostly to the fact that the UNESCO data classifi ed 
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We develop our argument by fi rst presenting evidence that this expansion of 
education in the Arab world was indeed matched with poor labor market prospects, 
and particularly so in the countries that have been at the heart of the protest wave. 
We show that this set of conditions is in turn associated with an increased propensity 
at the individual level towards engaging in political activities of a protest nature, 
especially among those who have received more education. We then argue that 
these conditions are useful predictors of political instability and incumbent change 
at the country level, although we caution that more work is needed to establish 
the causal nature of this relationship. Finally, we conclude by discussing several 
potential research directions, as well as the implications of our framework for some 
ongoing developments and debates. For convenience, we will refer to the Arab 
world and Middle East interchangeably. Our discussion will include Iran, which is 
not an Arab League member but largely follows the patterns discussed here. It will 
however exclude Israel and Turkey, which are geographically in the Middle East but 
face different economic and political challenges.
vocational and nonacademic educational training, which are very important in Germany, as part of lower 
levels of schooling.
Table 1
Increases in Schooling Attainment across the World 
(top 20 countries, 1980–2010)
Country
Years of 
schooling, 1980
Years of 
schooling, 2010
Increase in years of 
schooling
1. Botswana 3.12 9.56 6.44
2. Germany 5.61 11.82 6.21
3. Iran 3.34 8.59 5.25
4. Algeria 3.06 8.30 5.24
5. United Arab Emirates 3.88 9.12 5.23
6. Gabon 3.33 8.35 5.02
7. Brazil 2.77 7.54 4.77
8. Bahrain 4.92 9.59 4.67
9. Jordan 4.58 9.23 4.65
10. Libya 3.26 7.85 4.59
11. France 5.96 10.53 4.58
12. Malaysia 5.69 10.14 4.46
13. Bolivia 5.47 9.91 4.44
14. Egypt 2.65 7.08 4.43
15. El Salvador 3.58 7.97 4.39
16. Mexico 4.89 9.11 4.22
17. Spain 6.17 10.38 4.22
18. Saudi Arabia 4.38 8.48 4.10
19. Tunisia 3.25 7.32 4.07
20. Latvia 6.69 10.60 3.91
Source: Calculated from the Barro–Lee dataset (2010, version 1.2), based on the average 
total years of schooling in the population aged 15 and above.
Note: Arab League countries and Iran are in bold.
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Schooling and Economic Opportunities in the Arab World
In recent decades, the Arab region has been characterized by an expansion 
in schooling coupled with weak labor market conditions. This pattern is especially 
pronounced in those countries that saw signifi cant upheaval during the fi rst year of 
the Arab Spring uprisings.
Figure 1 compares the Arab world vis-à-vis the rest of the world along the two 
respective dimensions of schooling gains and labor market conditions. For ease of 
visualization, only the Arab League and Iran are labeled by their country names in 
the scatterplot. In both panels, the horizontal axis plots the change in average years 
of schooling between 1980 and 2010 in the general population—this is the same vari-
able that was reported in Table 1, calculated from the Barro and Lee (2010) dataset. 
The Arab countries are generally above the sample median (indicated by the vertical 
line) in terms of the gains in schooling attainment that they achieved. While many 
developing countries elsewhere also saw large improvements in schooling during this 
period, the Arab world had in many cases the advantage of oil revenues that supported 
the expansion of the education system (Daun and Arjmand 2002). These data admit-
tedly only provide a rough gauge of educational achievement. For instance, they say 
nothing about the content of education, and a comparatively high proportion of 
students’ time in Arab countries is devoted to religious studies that may be linked to 
lower labor market rewards (Daun and Arjmand 2002). Notwithstanding this caveat, 
the available data do suggest large gains in human capital in the Arab world.
No correlation between the two variables is obviously apparent in Figure 1—
nor would we have expected one—but one message that clearly emerges is that, 
in the Middle East, the gains in schooling were often not accompanied by abun-
dant labor market opportunities. Figure 1A plots the unemployment rate in the 
general population averaged over 2005–2009 on the vertical axis, as made available 
by the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. These data are drawn from 
the International Labor Organization (ILO), which compiles labor market statistics 
from labor force or household surveys conducted by country authorities around the 
world. These are convenient as a summary indicator of labor market prospects for a 
broad sample of countries. However, it should be noted that while the ILO defi nes 
the unemployment rate as the share of the labor force that is without work, but is 
available for and seeking employment, the defi nitions of what constitutes the labor 
force and unemployed status can differ from country to country.
Figure 1A confi rms that many Middle East countries have experienced unem-
ployment rates above the sample median (horizontal line). Indeed, many of the 
countries that have seen large-scale protests in the fi rst year of the Arab Spring are 
in the upper-right quadrant of this fi gure. Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, and Iran stand 
out in this regard, although Morocco and Jordan have also seen signifi cant though 
less violent protests. On the other hand, those Middle East countries with the lowest 
unemployment rates, namely Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, have 
seen some rise in political expression (for press coverage, see The Economist 2011c), 
but have not seen mass protests.
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Figure 1
Where the Arab Countries Stand: Labor Market Conditions against Schooling 
Investments
Source: Data on schooling from Barro and Lee (2010); other data from World Bank World Development 
Indicators.
Notes: Arab League countries and Iran are labeled by their country names, while all other countries are 
indicated by circular markers. The x -axis plots the change in years of schooling in the general population 
aged 15 and over, between 1980–2010. For the y -axis, Panel A plots the unemployment rate in the total 
labor force, while Panel B plots the employment-to-population ratio for the general population aged 
15 and over. All labor market variables are averaged over 2005–2009. Lines indicating the median values 
of the x - and y -axis variables are included.
B: Employment to population ratio (age ≥15) 
A: Unemployment rate (percent of labor force)
U
n
em
pl
oy
m
en
t r
at
e 
20
05
–2
00
9 
(p
er
ce
n
t)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
0–1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Change in years of schooling (1980–2010)
Iraq
Yemen
Tunisia
AlgeriaJordan
Kuwait
Qatar
UAE
Saudi Arabia
Morocco Egypt
Iran
Change in years of schooling (1980–2010)
0–1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t/
Po
pu
la
to
n
 (
20
05
–2
00
9)
.35
UAE
Qatar
Saudi ArabiaAlgeria
Bahrain
Kuwait
Sudan Morocco IranSyria
Iraq
Yemen
Tunisia
Libya
EgyptJordan
Mauritania
.40
.45
.50
.55
.60
.65
.70
.75
.80
.85
Syria
172     Journal of Economic Perspectives
A very similar picture emerges when we consider an alternative measure of 
the state of the labor market in Figure 1B, namely the employment-to-population 
ratio for the population aged 15 and older, once again averaged over 2005–2009. It 
measures the share of the population employed in the market production of goods 
and services. While these data are also taken from the World Development Indica-
tors and ultimately draw from the same ILO source as the unemployment data, they 
are potentially less subject to some idiosyncrasies that could distort the accuracy of 
unemployment rates as a description of labor market conditions. For instance, a 
country might have a relatively low unemployment rate because individuals drop 
out of the labor force in response to bleak job prospects. Most of the Middle East 
countries that have been at the center of violent protests exhibited large schooling 
gains and poor employment-to-population ratios, appearing in the lower-right quad-
rant of Figure 1B. In particular, this quadrant now includes Libya, for which the 
unemployment data were unavailable for Figure 1A. On the other hand, countries 
such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, which remained relatively peaceful 
amid the ongoing events in nearby countries, once again show up in the quadrant 
combining large gains in schooling and a relatively healthy labor market.3
The labor market prospects faced by skilled or educated workers in the Arab 
world appear to be especially weak. Figure 2 presents one such illustration based 
on the secondary unemployment rate over 2005–2009, namely the percentage of 
workers with some secondary education who are unemployed.4 This variable is analo-
gously plotted against the change between 1980 and 2010 in the average years of 
secondary schooling among those aged 15 and over. A key caveat here is that unem-
ployment data by education status is reported by fewer countries, so the scatterplot 
is much sparser; for example, Egypt and Algeria both drop out of the sample. The 
available data nevertheless provide a picture that is consistent with Figure 1: Protest-
prone Tunisia, Iran, and Morocco all saw relatively large increases in secondary 
schooling yet had high secondary unemployment rates. Kuwait and the United Arab 
Emirates on the other hand appear to have been the most successful in the region in 
providing job opportunities for the secondary-educated while averting major unrest 
at the same time.
An alternative approach to assessing the labor market rewards for educated 
individuals would be to examine the prevailing skill premium in Arab countries. On 
3 A very similar fi gure emerges when using the employment-to-population ratio for the male workforce 
only (also from the World Development Indicators), indicating that our conclusions are not overly 
driven by the relatively low levels of female participation in labor markets in the Arab world. We also 
obtained a similar set of scatterplots when using real GDP per capita from the Penn World Tables as an 
alternative proxy for economic conditions on the vertical axis. Both of these fi gures are available in the 
online Appendix. 
4 The available variable from the ILO actually reports the percentage of the unemployed who have 
a secondary schooling attainment. To convert this to the percentage of those with some secondary 
education who are unemployed, we multiply this by the overall unemployment rate and divide by the 
percentage of those aged 15 and above with some secondary education (from the Barro–Lee dataset). 
Data availability issues prevent us from building the same fi gure for tertiary unemployment rates for a 
large enough number of countries.
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this count, the data from Clemens, Montenegro, and Pritchett (2009, table 2) on 
immigrant wages in the United States uncover some indirect evidence. For instance, 
they show that very skilled Egyptians with at least some college-level education who 
migrated to the United States earned more than 13 times as much as comparable 
individuals who remained in their home country. While less-skilled Egyptians 
would also earn more in the United States than their counterparts back home, the 
premium in their case turns out to be smaller, namely a factor of ten for those 
with no more than a secondary education. A similar pattern also applies to Yemen, 
where the corresponding wage factors are eleven and nine for college-educated and 
secondary-educated immigrants to the U.S. economy, respectively. This pattern is 
in fact unusual for the sample of countries in Clemens, Montenegro, and Pritchett 
(2009), as the relative premium for immigrants with some tertiary education 
is often on par or even lower than the premium for immigrants with only some 
secondary education (relative to counterparts in their countries of origin). This is 
true in particular for the other two Arab countries in their sample, Morocco and 
Jordan, which incidentally did not see the Arab Spring boil over to the same degree: 
College-educated immigrants from Jordan earned a premium that was a factor of 
Figure 2
Where the Arab Countries Stand: Unemployment Rates against Secondary 
Schooling Investments
Notes: Arab League countries and Iran are labeled by their country names, while all other countries are 
indicated by circular markers. The x -axis plots the change in years of secondary schooling in the general 
population aged 15 and over, between 1980–2010. The y -axis plots the unemployment rate among 
workers with some secondary education, averaged over 2005–2009 (calculation described in the main 
text). Lines indicating the median values of the x - and y -axis variables are included.
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4.15, lower than the corresponding factor of 4.82 for those with some secondary 
education; in the case of Morocco, the immigrant-premium was essentially the same 
for both education categories (a factor of two). Egypt and Yemen thus seem to have 
had particularly unrewarding labor markets for the relatively skilled.
Still on this note, it is especially telling that the Tunisian street vendor, Mohamed 
Bouazizi, whose act of protest marked the start of the Arab Spring, was himself 
rumored to be a university graduate. Although this detail about his schooling was 
apocryphal (Fahim 2011), the fact that the rumor gained such traction is revealing 
of the strong current of job-related discontent amongst university graduates in 
Tunisia. Many observers have since drawn attention to the high unemployment 
rates that prevail among the increasing ranks of the educated in countries such as 
Tunisia and Egypt, pinning blame on the overbearing presence of an ineffi cient, 
heavily regulated state that crimps the development of independent enterprises and 
business activity (Ammous and Phelps 2011; Cassidy 2011; The Economist 2011b). For 
example, in the recent World Bank report on “Doing Business in the Arab World” 
(Doing Business 2011), the region as a whole ranked only ahead of South Asia and 
Sub-Saharan Africa on a composite index designed to capture how easy it is for 
small private fi rms to do business.5
Taken together, these different pieces of information build a narrative that 
suggests that the combination of rising levels of education and poor job prospects—
particularly for the relatively skilled—was present in the Arab world, and particularly 
so in those countries that have witnessed the Arab Spring in its fullest bloom.
The Links to Political Protest
Why would a large expansion in schooling and weak prospects for the work-
force open the door to political instability? A very robust and widespread body of 
empirical evidence has shown that individuals with higher educational attainment 
are more likely to engage in all types of political acts—whether because education 
increases awareness of political issues, fosters the socialization needed for effective 
political activity, or generally increases so-called civic skills (for example, Brady, 
Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Shleifer 2007). Indeed, evidence 
from randomized and quasi-experimental settings (such as Sondheimer and Green 
2010), as well as from instrumental variables approaches (such as Milligan, Moretti, 
and Oreopoulos 2004), suggest that the relationship from more education to 
greater political involvement is likely to be causal.
We believe that the attractiveness of the labor market returns for the skills 
acquired through education will infl uence the extent to which education would 
5 This average score for the Arab world masks a lot of diversity within the region: Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, 
and the United Arab Emirates were actually among the top 40 countries in the world on this index, with 
Qatar, Tunisia, and Oman not too far behind. The report also documents a number of positive reforms 
that have been undertaken by Arab countries in recent years.
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also raise one’s participation in political activities. In Campante and Chor (forth-
coming), we fl esh out a formal framework for understanding why this would be 
the case. Suppose that the skills and human capital acquired through education 
are useful both in production and political activities. In this setting, an economic 
environment in which human capital is more valuable in production will also be 
one where individuals are less likely to direct their human capital towards political 
participation, given the higher opportunity cost of the production income from 
labor markets that would be foregone. This tradeoff should be especially acute for 
those forms of political engagement that are effort-intensive, and so the economic 
environment should have a larger effect on the propensity to devote one’s human 
capital to labor-intensive activities like public protests as compared to less labor-
intensive acts like voting. In addition, weak economic conditions that affect all 
workers’ incomes proportionately should lead to a relatively larger response in 
political participation from more-educated individuals, given the higher value 
of the foregone income that such individuals should in principle command. In 
fact, the importance of the opportunity cost of political activity has been used in a 
number of ways in the literature. For example, it has been emphasized in the study 
of regime transitions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2001, 2005; Brückner and Ciccone 
2011), civil wars (Grossman 1991; Collier and Hoeffl er 2004), and political violence 
in general (Besley and Persson 2011).
In the years leading up to the events of the Arab Spring, the expansion of 
schooling in the Arab world increased the pool of individuals who had completed 
primary and attained some secondary schooling (and beyond) but who had not seen 
that education rewarded in the labor market. The low opportunity cost of political 
participation would thus make such individuals more likely instead to channel their 
efforts towards political action, and political protest in particular. We can explore 
this prediction using response data from the World Values Survey, a comprehen-
sive study on sociocultural and political attitudes conducted periodically around 
the world. We draw on the most recent complete wave of this survey, which was 
conducted from 2005–2007. Several questions in the survey pertain to one’s propen-
sity to engage in a number of different political activities, including “attending lawful 
demonstrations” (question E026). The response options to this question are “Would 
never do,” “Might do,” or “Have done,” which we coded respectively as 0, 1, and 2 
to provide a score of an individual’s self-reported propensity towards this effort-
intensive form of political participation. We took a simple average of this individual 
score for those respondents in each country who reported having at least some 
secondary education (usually numbering several hundred per country).6 We focus 
specifi cally on these respondents, because our argument implies that country differ-
ences in the propensity to demonstrate should be even starker for individuals with 
higher levels of education. It is unlikely, after all, that primary education focused on 
basic literacy and numeracy would have the same effect on political involvement as 
6 This corresponds to individuals who reported at least a 3 on the World Values Survey 8-point scale of 
education status.
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the teaching of critical thinking skills in secondary and tertiary schooling. We were 
able to compute this country score for only 40 countries, admittedly a relatively 
small number.
Figure 3 compares the average country scores within each of the quadrants 
of Figure 1A—that is, grouping countries according to whether they are above or 
below the world median in terms of schooling gains and the unemployment rate. 
Figure 3A shows that there is a higher average propensity to attend lawful demon-
strations in countries that were above the median in terms of the increase in years 
of schooling. Most notably, this difference is entirely driven by the subgroup of 
countries that also saw relatively high unemployment rates. In short, greater gains 
in education at the country level appear to be associated with a stronger individual 
propensity towards protest activities, but much more so when they are combined 
with poor labor market conditions.
On the other hand, a less distinct pattern emerges when we consider a form 
of political activity that is less effort intensive, namely voting. Voting has been 
described as “the only political act requiring relatively little initiative” (Verba and 
Nie 1987, p.77) as well as being the least demanding in terms of civic skills (Brady, 
Verba, and Schlozman 1995). Figure 3B reproduces the above exercise using instead 
the response to a binary voting variable from the World Values Survey (question 
E257)—whether the individual voted in the most recent parliamentary election—to 
compute the country political participation score. The interaction between educa-
tion and economic circumstances does not appear to operate as clearly in promoting 
this form of political activity, which is consistent with the lower opportunity cost of 
time and effort associated with voting.
Of course, the illustrative presentation of the data patterns here is only a 
starting point, but we have explored these patterns of political participation more 
formally using data from the World Values Survey and the Comparative Study of 
Electoral Systems in Campante and Chor (forthcoming). For example, in coun-
tries well endowed with resources that are likely to decrease the relative returns to 
human capital in production—for example, resources such as land that are associ-
ated with less skill-intensive activities—the positive correlation between education 
and participation at the individual level was stronger precisely in effort-intensive 
political activities such as attending demonstrations or occupying buildings. At 
a more micro level, we also found that individuals who worked in unskilled or 
manual occupations showed a greater propensity than those in skilled occupa-
tions to devote some of any incremental human capital towards political activities.7 
In Campante and Chor (2011), we have undertaken a more rigorous empirical 
exploration of these ideas using the full individual-level data in the World Values 
Survey. We found that while more-educated individuals are more likely to engage 
7 In a similar vein, Charles and Stephens (2011) provide evidence that positive labor market shocks tend 
to reduce voter turnout in local U.S. elections. They attribute this fi nding to the increased opportunity 
cost of using one’s time to pay attention to and gather information on political developments related to 
municipal issues, which tend to receive less media coverage than national issues.
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Figure 3
Individual Engagement in Political Activities across Different Sets of Countries 
(Restricted to Individuals with at Least Some Secondary Education)
Source: Authors based on data from the World Values Survey.
Notes: The propensity to demonstrate scores in Panel A are calculated from Wave 5 of the World Values 
Survey, averaged over individuals in each country to obtain a country score. The range of values of this score 
is from 0 to 2. The propensity to vote in Panel B is calculated from a binary variable on participation in voting 
from Wave 5 of the World Values Survey, averaged over individuals in each country to obtain a country score. 
The range of values of this variable is from 0 to 1. All country scores are calculated using only individuals with 
some secondary education (at least 3 on the Survey’s 8-point scale of education status). The columns in each 
panel report the mean country scores as grouped by the four quadrants in Figure 1A, namely: above/below 
the median unemployment rate and above/below the median change in schooling years.
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in political acts such as demonstrations, boycotts, and strikes, this link between 
education and political protest is stronger among those individuals who under-
perform in the labor market. To be specifi c, we constructed a measure of income 
underperformance as the extent to which an individual’s reported income status 
falls below that predicted by a regression model based on a comprehensive set 
of observable characteristics for the individual, including importantly their level 
of schooling. We further verifi ed that many of the Arab countries present in the 
World Values Survey also tended to display very high average levels of income 
underperformance, relative to other countries, for individuals who have some 
secondary education. In fact, Morocco, Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, and Algeria were 
among the worst-ranked countries on this count when compared with the rest of 
the world.
At this juncture, we should distinguish our argument from the long line of 
thought that has held that “grievances” can provide the fuel for demonstrations. 
For instance, Opp (1988) links grievances to participation in social movements, 
and Verba, Nie, and Kim (1987, p.161) argue that a “group [that is] particularly 
motivated by a sense of grievance vis-à-vis other groups . . . may become much more 
active than its socioeconomic level would predict.” Such “grievance” effects driven 
by economic frustration were certainly present during the Arab Spring. Take for 
example the results of a poll conducted by the International Republican Institute 
in Egypt in April 2011, shortly after the resignation of President Mubarak. Out of 
the 28 percent of respondents who claimed that they had taken part in the recent 
protests, 64 percent cited “low living standards/lack of jobs” as their primary moti-
vation, far above the 19 percent who mentioned “lack of democracy and political 
reform” (International Republican Institute 2011). Indeed, 41 percent of the 
respondents indicated that they “have trouble feeding [themselves] and [their] 
family and buying even the most essential things for survival.”
We certainly do not discount the importance of the pure “grievance” effect. 
Nevertheless, we would argue that it becomes diffi cult to explain the patterns 
in the data fully if we do not complement a grievance-based explanation with 
the opportunity cost effect that we emphasize. After all, one could envision that 
the public could be angry at the economic situation but apathetic, particularly if 
the time and effort cost of engaging in political action is too high. In our inter-
pretation, individuals would be more prone to devote their energies to political 
protest not only because they are aggrieved, but also because it is less costly to do 
so when labor market conditions are weak. And the weak labor market conditions 
lower the opportunity cost of political activity more for the highly educated than 
the less educated (whose time is less valued by the labor market regardless of 
broader economic circumstances) and more for effort-intensive activities than 
for less intensive ones. Thus, one can now explain why the combination of more 
schooling and poor economic conditions will manifest itself in effort-intensive 
forms of political participation without having to assume that the grievance 
motive would somehow both gain traction with more education and express itself 
especially through those forms of participation.
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From a broader perspective, the opportunity cost argument also helps us to 
make sense of some evidence that leans against the mainstream fi nding of a positive 
impact of schooling on political participation at the individual level. Several papers 
have reported fi nding a small or even insignifi cant causal effect of education (for 
example, Tenn 2007; Kam and Palmer 2008; Berinsky and Lenz 2010). There is also 
some evidence that this correlation is considerably weaker in low-income countries 
(Pande 2011). However, all of these exceptions have to do with voting, a relatively 
less effort-intensive activity for which we would expect the opportunity cost forces 
to be weaker. Such fi ndings underscore the need to distinguish between different 
forms of political engagement, which are quite possibly affected by the economic 
and institutional environment in different ways.
All in all, we have offered suggestive evidence that the combination of educa-
tion and unrewarding economic circumstances is associated with an increased 
propensity towards political protest. Since we have also argued that the Arab world 
indeed witnessed both substantial investment in education and poor labor market 
conditions, it is plausible to think that this combination was important as a root 
cause of the Arab Spring.
Of course, a number of other structural forces have been mentioned in connec-
tion with the Middle East turmoil, and it is useful to acknowledge these and how they 
might complement our framework. In particular, the youthful demographic profi le 
of the affected countries has featured prominently in these discussions, motivated 
by the evidence, from casual observation, and from arguments by political scientists 
like Urdal (2006), that youth are more prone to acts of political protest or violence. 
We briefl y explore this “youth hypothesis” in Figure 4. The upper panel plots the 
change in the share of the population aged 15–24 (out of the population aged 
15 and over) from the Barro and Lee (2010) dataset on the horizontal axis. A quick 
look at this fi gure reveals that Syria, Egypt, Yemen, and Iran did see a large increase 
in this youth cohort share from 1980 to 2010. On the other hand, countries like 
Tunisia, Jordan, Algeria, and Morocco actually experienced fairly large declines in 
the relative size of this youth cohort during this period.
The picture changes considerably however if we focus on the share of the 
population aged 25–39 instead. Figure 4B illustrates that all the countries that 
were affected by signifi cant uprisings during the Arab Spring were also places 
where the share of the population aged 25–39 had increased considerably from 
1980 to 2010 amid a labor market climate featuring high unemployment rates. It 
thus seems that the demographic shifts in this “not-so-young” age cohort might 
actually be more relevant for the recent Arab experience. It is perhaps no coin-
cidence that the age 25–39 cohort consists of young workers entering the prime 
of their working age years, whose political behavior would be more liable to 
respond to prevailing conditions in the labor market. In other words, Figure 4B 
suggests that the “youth hypothesis” refers most fully to younger members of the 
workforce with poor economic prospects, who would be particularly inclined to 
revolt. We view this as entirely consistent with the opportunity cost mechanism 
we emphasize.
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Figure 4
Was it the Youth Revolution? Unemployment Rates against the Population Shares 
of Young Cohorts
Notes: Arab League countries and Iran are labeled by their country names, while all other countries are 
indicated by circular markers. The y -axis plots the unemployment rate in the total labor force, averaged 
over 2005–2009. For the x -axis, Panel A plots the change in the population share aged 15–24 (as a share 
of that aged 15 and over), while Panel B plots the change in the population share aged 25–39 (as a 
share of that aged 15 and over). Both population share changes are calculated from 1980 to 2010. Lines 
indicating the median values of the x- and y -axis variables are included.
A: Unemployment rate against the change in population share (age 15–24)
B: Unemployment rate against the change in population share (age 25–39)
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Links to Political Change
Even if education and poor economic rewards tend to be correlated with a 
greater propensity towards protest activities at the individual level, it does not follow 
immediately that, at the aggregate level, these variables would be associated with 
political change. Of course, it is not enough to point to the Arab Spring as vindica-
tion: Why then did the Middle East experience this sudden wave of uprisings, but 
not other countries with similar structural conditions? In other words, why have 
the other countries in the upper-right quadrant of Figure 1A not gone through 
their own “springtime”? Perhaps they will in the future, but more generally it seems 
plausible that revolutionary episodes are not deterministic processes, so their occur-
rence might not even be guaranteed even in relatively favorable conditions.
Can we nevertheless say something more systematic about how the interac-
tion of increased education and economic circumstances affects the probability of 
episodes of political change? To take a stab at these questions, we use a measure 
of political change that we have built based on turnover data on country leaders 
compiled from WorldStatesmen.org, an encyclopedia that provides detailed chro-
nologies of heads of state and heads of government around the world.8 We construct 
a binary indicator for whether there is any change in the chief executive running 
the country during a given fi ve-year window, namely 1990–1994, 1995–1999, and 
so on. Note that, for this variable, we do not distinguish between changes that are 
brought about by peaceful democratic processes or violent revolutions, although we 
will return to a discussion on this issue later below. We estimate probit regressions 
on this indicator of executive change, where the key explanatory variables are the 
same measures of the unemployment rate and the change in the average years of 
schooling that we have already been using. Due to how sparse the unemployment 
data become across countries as we go further back in time, we focus our analysis on 
the period between 1990 and 2009, taking averages of the unemployment rate over 
each fi ve-year window. (For the change in schooling variable, we calculate this for 
the 1990–1994 observation as the difference in average years of schooling between 
1985 and 1990, and so on.) Given the panel nature of our approach, we include 
country and time dummies in our regressions, while also clustering the standard 
errors by country. The country fi xed effects in particular are useful for control-
ling for omitted variables such as social or even geographical features. One might 
suspect for instance that the concentration of Sunnis, or whether a country is a Gulf 
versus non-Gulf state, might otherwise be correlated with a country’s investment in 
education or its unemployment rate.
Table 2 contains the results of this exercise. The fi rst column shows that 
the incidence of executive change is positively correlated with the unemploy-
ment rate; on the other hand, its correlation with changes in years of schooling 
8 To guard against concerns that might be raised over the open-source nature of the website, we have 
compared the records in WorldStatesmen.org against other data sources as a cross-check for the years in 
which political transitions occurred. See Campante, Chor, and Do (2009) for more details.
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is statistically insignifi cant. The second column uncovers how a combination of 
schooling increases and weak labor markets is associated with a greater likelihood 
of incumbent change: the coeffi cient of the interaction term between the change 
in average years of schooling and the unemployment rate is positive and signifi cant 
at the 1 percent level. In column 3, we incorporate variables that would help to 
account for the possible role of a youthful demography in driving political change, 
specifi cally by controlling for the lagged fi ve-year change in the share of the popula-
tion aged 15–24, as well as its interaction with the prevailing unemployment rate. 
We fi nd evidence here that the role of schooling increases is indeed statistically 
Table 2
Labor Market Conditions and Schooling Gains: Implications for Incumbent 
Stability
Dependent Variable: Change in Executive (1 = Yes, 0 = No)
Probit regressions
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment Rate 0.086**
(0.037)
0.044
(0.041)
0.041
(0.041)
0.082*
(0.048)
Change in Years of Schooling 0.023
(0.411)
–1.448**
(0.586)
–1.440**
(0.582)
–1.298**
(0.581)
Unemployment Rate
 × Change in Years of Schooling
0.130***
(0.043)
0.129***
(0.043)
0.105**
(0.047)
Change in Population Share 15–24 0.055
(0.124)
–0.113
(0.166)
Unemployment Rate
 × Change in Population Share 15–24
–0.005
(0.010)
0.018
(0.014)
Change in Population Share 25–39 –0.207
(0.148)
Unemployment Rate
 × Change in Population Share 25–39
0.029**
(0.013)
Country dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 274 274 274 274
Number of countries 70 70 70 70
Pseudo R 2 0.132 0.155 0.156 0.167
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by country. All columns are probit regressions with 
country and year fi xed effects. The data used run from 1990 to 2009. Observations are constructed for 
fi ve-year windows, for example 1990–1994. The dependent variable is a binary variable indicating the 
occurrence of a change in the chief executive governing the country during a given fi ve-year window. 
The unemployment rate is the average over the fi ve years. The change in years of schooling and 
change in population shares are calculated as the value observed at the start of the window minus that 
observed at the start of the preceding fi ve-year window (for 1990–1994, this is the 1990 value minus 
the 1985 value).
***, **, and * denote signifi cance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively.
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robust to and distinct from the “youth hypothesis,” at least when the latter is repre-
sented by the age 15–24 cohort. Our central fi ndings do seem to be complemented, 
though, by the change in the population cohort share that is aged 25–39, as shown 
in column 4. Countries that saw large increases in the size of this “not-so-young” 
cohort amid a labor market with a high unemployment rate are in turn more liable 
to experience a change in political leadership. This in fact augments the role of 
the underlying expansion of schooling, as the signifi cance of the interaction of this 
previous term with the unemployment rate remains signifi cant. Overall, we view 
this as consistent with the idea that the opportunity cost in labor markets helps 
to explain the patterns in the political turnover data, as this slightly older cohort 
should be most active in labor markets and not obviously more (or less) likely to 
hold grievances.
While we would refrain from placing too much emphasis on the specifi c 
numbers from these illustrative regressions, the lesson we draw is that our story of 
interest can be quite important and useful for predicting the likelihood of turnover.9 
These implications for regime stability are explored further and more formally in a 
cross-country regression framework in Campante and Chor (2011).
As previously mentioned, our cross-country analysis does not distinguish 
between the means by which regime change was triggered, in part to avoid having 
to make arbitrary choices regarding what constitutes an instance of turnover driven 
by a revolution. We would moreover argue that our mechanism applies just as 
well to a situation where an incumbent might be brought down within an existing 
democratic framework as a result of political pressure from mass demonstrations or 
strikes. Having said this, the Middle East countries do differ signifi cantly from the 
other countries in the upper-right quadrant of Figure 1A on one key dimension: 
democracy. To illustrate this, we use the Polity IV database, which gives countries 
a “Democracy” score on a 0 to 10 scale, based on the assessment of a list of institu-
tional features meant to capture the characteristics of a well-functioning democracy 
(Marshall and Jaggers 2011). The data are available on a yearly basis, and for each 
country in the upper-right quadrant of Figure 1A, we compute an average 2005–
2009 score. As it turns out, the average score for the non–Middle East countries 
in that quadrant is around 8.3, in contrast with a Middle East average of 1.1. In 
other words, one dimension that sets the Middle East countries apart is that they 
are highly nondemocratic when compared with the other countries in that quad-
rant. Thus, one interpretation is that in the absence of democratic mechanisms 
for regime change, the societal pressures that had been building up in the Middle 
East against incumbents were pent up and eventually found expression in popular 
outbursts of protest. Alternatively, those pressures exerted by the combination of 
9 In terms of the quantitative implications of this probit model, the column 4 estimates suggest that a one 
standard deviation increase in the unemployment rate (roughly six percentage points for the countries 
in the sample in 2005–2009) would be associated with an increase in the probability of turnover of about 
36 percent. About seven-tenths of this increase can be attributed to the main effect of the unemploy-
ment rate alone, with the remaining three-tenths due to the interaction of the unemployment rate with 
increases in schooling. (We evaluate all other country variables at their mean values in 2005–2009.)
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schooling increases and poor economic circumstances might have found a more 
peaceful resolution within the democratic institutional framework in other coun-
tries, through, for example, the removal of incumbents via the electoral process.
This interpretation does receive some support from the data on incumbent 
changes. Of the 19 non–Middle East countries in the upper-right quadrant of 
Figure 1A, 13 had experienced at least one change in the identity of the chief execu-
tive between 2005 and 2009. In contrast, among the eight Middle East countries in 
that quadrant, only two saw a change, namely Iran and Iraq—and of course, Iraq is 
a peculiar case associated with a transition away from a foreign intervening power. 
Moreover, there is only one non–Middle East country, Kazakhstan, in this high 
unemployment, high schooling-gains quadrant, that shares a similarly low democ-
racy score as the Middle East. While we would refrain from making overconfi dent 
predictions, we would not be shocked to see some political instability in Kazakhstan 
in the not-too-distant future.
What Can We Hope to Learn?
We have argued that the lack of adequate economic opportunities for an 
increasingly educated populace can help us understand episodes of regime insta-
bility such as the Arab Spring. Our work in this area can be viewed in the context of 
the long-running debate over the “modernization hypothesis.” In the classic view put 
forth by Lipset (1960), economic and institutional development tend to go hand in 
hand, and so “modernization”—including the expansion of education—naturally 
begets democracy. In an alternative view memorably put forward by Huntington 
(1968), modernization can instead be destabilizing in the absence of the neces-
sary institutional infrastructure to support the process of change. Przeworski and 
Limongi (1997) survey and assess this extensive literature.
The major diffi culty in distinguishing between these two camps has been 
empirical in nature. Cross-country studies generally confi rm the strong positive raw 
correlation linking education and democracy (for example, Barro 1999; Przeworski, 
Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi 2000). However, the empirical work has struggled 
to show a clear causal effect from within-country increases in schooling to improve-
ments in democracy. For example, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 
(2004) fi nd Lipsetian results, while Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared 
(2009) argue that these fi ndings are spurious, in that they are driven by the joint 
increase over the years of both education and the spread of democracy across rather 
than within countries.10
10 Bobba and Coviello (2007) offer an econometric perspective on this debate. A similar challenge 
has emerged when it comes to the closely-related problem of establishing a causal effect fl owing from 
income growth to democratization (Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared 2008, 2009). Moral-Benito 
and Bartolucci (2011) argue that there is evidence for a nonlinear effect, namely that rising income 
fosters democracy, but only up to a certain level of income.
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Our approach seeks to break down the broader theories about modernization 
into more specifi c underlying mechanisms: in our case, the interaction between the 
schooling background and economic circumstances faced by individuals. We have 
focused on how economic circumstances affect the opportunity cost of political 
participation, but other mechanisms are certainly possible. In one recent example, 
Friedman, Kremer, Miguel, and Thornton (2011) have explored how schooling 
affects political views and attitudes using a randomized fi eld experiment in Kenya 
that increased individual schooling levels via the assignment of merit scholarships. 
Their results point at increased knowledge within the treatment group, but also a 
greater disenchantment with politics and (perhaps surprisingly) a greater accep-
tance of political violence. Another approach looks at what is taught and how. Algan, 
Cahuc, and Shleifer (2011) fi nd that different teaching methods—for example, 
group discussion versus lecturing—seem to infl uence students’ views and beliefs.
Our broader thesis may also apply beyond the Middle East. For instance, 
several observers have pointed to China as an example of a developing country that 
has recently seen an increased scarcity of job opportunities for university graduates 
against the backdrop of a rapid expansion of the tertiary education sector in the 
past decade ( Jacobs 2010; Eichengreen 2011). Our interpretation of recent events 
in the Arab world reinforces the view that China may well face a rise in political 
instability if the Chinese economy does not sustain a pace of growth that generates 
suffi cient jobs to keep up with the education profi le of its population. All in all, the 
connections between education, the economic environment, individual political 
engagement, and institutional change will most certainly continue to play a large 
role in driving political developments and dynamics in the years to come.
■ We thank the editors and Chris Avery for their supportive and helpful comments.
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